
The Peloponnesian War
by Kagan, Donald-
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Summary
Author Biography
Table of Contents
Introduction | p. xxiii |
The Road to War | p. 1 |
The Great Rivalry (479-439) | p. 3 |
Sparta and its Alliance | p. 3 |
Athens and its Empire | p. 7 |
Athens Against Sparta | p. 13 |
The Thirty Years' Peace | p. 18 |
Threats to Peace: Thurii | p. 20 |
The Samian Rebellion | p. 22 |
"A Quarrel in a Far-away Country" (436-433) | p. 25 |
Epidamnus | p. 25 |
Corinth | p. 28 |
Enter Athens (433-432) | p. 30 |
The Battle of Sybota | p. 34 |
Potidaea | p. 36 |
The Megarian Decree | p. 39 |
The Decisions for War (432) | p. 41 |
Sparta Chooses War | p. 41 |
The Athenian Decision for War | p. 47 |
Pericles' War | p. 55 |
War Aims and Resources (432-431) | p. 57 |
Sparta | p. 57 |
Athens | p. 60 |
The Theban Attack on Plataea (431) | p. 64 |
The Spartan Invasion of Attica | p. 66 |
Attacks on Pericles | p. 68 |
The Athenian Response | p. 70 |
Pericles' Funeral Oration | p. 73 |
The War's First Year: An Accounting | p. 74 |
The Plague (430-429) | p. 76 |
Epidaurus | p. 76 |
The Plague in Athens | p. 78 |
Pericles Under Fire | p. 79 |
Peace Negotiations | p. 80 |
Pericles Condemned | p. 83 |
The Spartans go to Sea | p. 84 |
Potidaea Recaptured | p. 85 |
Pericles' Last Days (429) | p. 87 |
Sparta Attacks Plataea | p. 87 |
Spartan Action in the Northwest | p. 90 |
Enter Phormio | p. 91 |
The Spartans Attack Piraeus | p. 96 |
The Death of Pericles | p. 97 |
Rebellion in the Empire (428-427) | p. 99 |
The "New Politicians" in Athens | p. 99 |
Conspiracy on Lesbos | p. 100 |
Athens Reacts | p. 101 |
Mytilene Appeals to the Peloponnesians | p. 102 |
The Siege of Mytilene | p. 104 |
Sparta Acts on Land and Sea | p. 105 |
The Fate of Mytilene | p. 107 |
The Mytilene Debate: Cleon Versus Diodotus | p. 109 |
Terror and Adventure (427) | p. 113 |
The Fate of Plataea | p. 113 |
Civil War at Corcyra | p. 114 |
First Athenian Expedition to Sicily | p. 118 |
New Strategies | p. 123 |
Demosthenes and the New Strategy (426) | p. 125 |
The Spartans in Central Greece | p. 125 |
Athenian Initiatives | p. 128 |
Demosthenes' Aetolian Campaign | p. 129 |
The Spartans Attack the Northwest | p. 132 |
Pylos and Sphacteria (425) | p. 137 |
Athens' Western Commitments | p. 137 |
Demosthenes' Plan: The Fort at Pylos | p. 138 |
The Spartans on Sphacteria | p. 140 |
The Athenian Naval Victory | p. 142 |
Sparta's Peace Offer | p. 144 |
Cleon Against Nicias | p. 147 |
The Spartan Surrender on Sphacteria | p. 150 |
Athens on the Offensive: Megara and Delium (424) | p. 157 |
Cythera and Thyrea | p. 157 |
Disappointment in Sicily | p. 159 |
The Assault on Megara | p. 162 |
Athens' Boeotian Invasion | p. 165 |
Delium | p. 167 |
Brasidas' Thracian Campaign (424-423) | p. 171 |
The Capture of Amphipolis | p. 173 |
Thucydides at Amphipolis | p. 176 |
Truce | p. 178 |
Nicias' Expedition to Thrace | p. 180 |
The Coming of Peace (422-421) | p. 182 |
Cleon in Command | p. 182 |
The Battle of Amphipolis | p. 185 |
The Death of Brasidas and Cleon | p. 187 |
The Coming of Peace | p. 187 |
The Peace of Nicias | p. 191 |
The False Peace | p. 195 |
The Peace Unravels (421-420) | p. 197 |
A Troubled Peace | p. 197 |
The Spartan-Athenian Alliance | p. 198 |
The Argive League | p. 200 |
Sparta's Problems | p. 203 |
The Corinthians' Mysterious Policy | p. 206 |
The Boeotians | p. 207 |
The Alliance of Athens and Argos (420-418) | p. 210 |
The Athenian Breach with Sparta | p. 210 |
Spartan Humiliations | p. 215 |
Alcibiades in the Peloponnesus | p. 217 |
The Spartans Against Argos | p. 218 |
Confrontation in the Argive Plain | p. 221 |
The Battle of Mantinea (418) | p. 228 |
Agis' March to Tegea | p. 228 |
To Force a Battle | p. 230 |
The Allied Army Moves | p. 234 |
The Battle | p. 235 |
Politics Intervene | p. 239 |
The Meaning of Mantinea | p. 241 |
After Mantinea: Politics and Policy at Sparta and Athens (418-416) | p. 244 |
Democracy Restored to Argos | p. 244 |
Politics at Athens | p. 245 |
Ostracism of Hyperbolus | p. 245 |
The Athenian Conquest of Melos | p. 247 |
Nicias Against Alcibiades | p. 249 |
The Disaster in Sicily | p. 251 |
The Decision (416-415) | p. 253 |
Athens' Sicilian Connections | p. 253 |
The Debate in Athens | p. 254 |
The Debate to Reconsider | p. 256 |
The Home Front and the First Campaigns (415) | p. 262 |
Sacrilege | p. 262 |
Witch Hunt | p. 264 |
Athenian Strategy | p. 267 |
The Summer Campaign of 415 | p. 270 |
The Flight of Alcibiades | p. 273 |
The First Attack on Syracuse (415) | p. 275 |
The Athenians at Syracuse | p. 275 |
Syracusan Resistance | p. 279 |
Alcibiades at Sparta | p. 280 |
The Siege of Syracuse (414) | p. 284 |
The Illness of Nicias and the Death of Lamachus | p. 286 |
Athens Breaks the Treaty | p. 289 |
Help Arrives at Syracuse | p. 289 |
Nicias Moves to Plemmyrium | p. 291 |
Nicias' Letter to Athens | p. 293 |
The Athenian Response | p. 295 |
The Besiegers Besieged (414-413) | p. 298 |
Sparta Takes the Offensive | p. 298 |
The Fort at Decelea | p. 299 |
Reinforcements for Both Sides | p. 300 |
The Capture of Plemmyrium | p. 301 |
The Battle in the Great Harbor | p. 303 |
The Second Athenian Armada: Demosthenes' Plan | p. 306 |
The Night Attack on Epipolae | p. 307 |
Retreat or Remain? | p. 308 |
Eclipse | p. 310 |
Defeat and Destruction (413) | p. 313 |
The Final Naval Battle | p. 313 |
The Final Retreat | p. 316 |
The Fate of the Athenians | p. 319 |
A Judgment on Nicias | p. 321 |
Revolutions in the Empire and in Athens | p. 325 |
After the Disaster (413-412) | p. 327 |
The Probouloi | p. 328 |
Spartan Ambitions | p. 330 |
Agis in Command | p. 333 |
Persian Initiatives | p. 333 |
The Spartans Choose Chios | p. 335 |
Alcibiades Intervenes | p. 337 |
Tissaphernes' Draft Treaty | p. 339 |
War in the Aegean (412-411) | p. 341 |
Athens Fights Back | p. 341 |
Decision at Miletus | p. 344 |
Alcibiades Joins the Persians | p. 346 |
A New Spartan Agreement with Persia | p. 349 |
A New Spartan Strategy | p. 351 |
Rebellion at Rhodes | p. 354 |
The Importance of Euboea | p. 356 |
A New Treaty with Persia | p. 357 |
The Spartans in the Hellespont | p. 358 |
The Revolutionary Movement (411) | p. 361 |
The Aristocratic Tradition | p. 362 |
Democracy and the War | p. 364 |
Thrasybulus and the Moderates | p. 365 |
The Real Oligarchs | p. 367 |
Phrynichus Against Alcibiades | p. 368 |
The Coup (411) | p. 371 |
Peisander's Mission to Athens | p. 371 |
The Oligarchs' Breach with Alcibiades | p. 373 |
Divisions Among the Plotters | p. 375 |
The Democracy Overthrown | p. 376 |
The Oligarchic Leaders | p. 379 |
The Four Hundred in Power (411) | p. 381 |
The Democracy at Samos | p. 384 |
Pharnabazus and the Hellespont | p. 387 |
Alcibiades Recalled | p. 388 |
The Five Thousand (411) | p. 392 |
Dissent Within the Four Hundred | p. 392 |
The Oligarchic Plot to Betray Athens | p. 393 |
The Threat to Euboea | p. 396 |
The Fall of the Four Hundred | p. 398 |
The Constitution of the Five Thousand | p. 398 |
The Five Thousand in Action | p. 400 |
War in the Hellespont (411-410) | p. 402 |
The Phantom Phoenician Fleet | p. 402 |
The Battle of Cynossema | p. 403 |
The Battle of Abydos | p. 408 |
The Battle of Cyzicus | p. 410 |
The Fall of Athens | p. 415 |
The Restoration (410-409) | p. 417 |
Sparta's Peace Offer | p. 417 |
Democracy Restored | p. 420 |
The War Resumed | p. 424 |
The Return of Alcibiades (409-408) | p. 427 |
Athens Attempts to Clear the Straits | p. 427 |
Athenian Negotiations with Persia | p. 431 |
Alcibiades Returns | p. 432 |
Cyrus, Lysander, and the Fall of Alcibiades (408-406) | p. 437 |
Prince Cyrus Replaces Tissaphernes | p. 437 |
The Emergence of Lysander | p. 438 |
The Collaboration of Cyrus and Lysander | p. 441 |
The Battle of Notium | p. 442 |
The Fall of Alcibiades | p. 446 |
Arginusae (406) | p. 448 |
The New Navarch | p. 448 |
Conon Trapped at Mytilene | p. 451 |
Athens Rebuilds a Navy | p. 452 |
The Battle of Arginusae | p. 454 |
Rescue and Recovery | p. 459 |
The Trial of the Generals | p. 461 |
The Fall of Athens (405-404) | p. 467 |
Another Spartan Peace Offer | p. 467 |
The Return of Lysander | p. 469 |
The Battle of Aegospotami | p. 471 |
The Results of the Battle | p. 476 |
The Fate of Athens | p. 478 |
Theramenes Negotiates a Peace | p. 480 |
Conclusion | p. 485 |
Sources for the History of the Peloponnesian War | p. 491 |
Index | p. 495 |
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. |
Excerpts
INTRODUCTION
For almost three decades at the end of the fifth century b.c. the Athenian Empire fought the Spartan Alliance in a terrible war that changed the Greek world and its civilization forever. Only a half-century before its outbreak the united Greeks, led by Sparta and Athens, had fought off an assault by the mighty Persian Empire, preserving their independence by driving Persia's armies and navies out of Europe and recovering the Greek cities on the coasts of Asia Minor from its grasp.
This astonishing victory opened a proud era of growth, prosperity, and confidence in Greece. The Athenians, especially, flourished, increasing in population and establishing an empire that brought them wealth and glory. Their young democracy came to maturity, bringing political participation, opportunity, and political power even to the lowest class of citizens, and their novel constitution went on to take root in other Greek cities. It was a time of extraordinary cultural achievement, as well, probably unmatched in originality and richness in all of human history. Dramatic poets like Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes raised tragedy and comedy to a level never surpassed. The architects and sculptors who created the Parthenon and other buildings on the Acropolis in Athens, at Olympia, and all over the Greek world powerfully influenced the course of Western art and still do so today. Natural philosophers like Anaxagoras and Democritus used unaided human reason to seek an understanding of the physical world, and such pioneers of moral and political philosophy as Protagoras and Socrates did the same in the realm of human affairs. Hippocrates and his school made great advances in medical science, and Herodotus invented historiography as we understand it today.
The Peloponnesian War not only brought this remarkable period to an end, but was recognized as a critical turning point even by those who fought it. The great historian Thucydides tells us that he undertook his history as the war began,
in the belief that it would be great and noteworthy above all the wars that had gone before, inferring this from the fact that both powers were then at their best in preparedness for war in every way, and seeing the rest of the Hellenic people taking sides with one side or the other, some at once, others planning to do so. For this was the greatest upheaval that had ever shaken the Hellenes, extending also to some part of the barbarians, one might say even to a very large part of mankind. (1.1.2)1
From the perspective of the fifth-century Greeks the Peloponnesian War was legitimately perceived as a world war, causing enormous destruction of life and property, intensifying factional and class hostility, and dividing the Greek states internally and destabilizing their relationship to one another, which ultimately weakened their capacity to resist conquest from outside. It also reversed the tendency toward the growth of democracy. When Athens was powerful and successful, its democratic constitution had a magnetic effect on other states, but its defeat was decisive in the political development of Greece, sending it in the direction of oligarchy.
The Peloponnesian War was also a conflict of unprecedented brutality, violating even the harsh code that had previously governed Greek warfare and breaking through the thin line that separates civilization from savagery. Anger, frustration, and the desire for vengeance increased as the fighting dragged on, resulting in a progression of atrocities that included maiming and killing captured opponents; throwing them into pits to die of thirst, starvation, and exposure; and hurling them into the sea to drown. Bands of marauders murdered innocent children. Entire cities were destroyed, their men killed, their women and children sold as slaves. On the island of Corcyra, now called Corfu, the victorious faction in a civil war brought on by the larger struggle butchered their fellow citizens for a full week: "Sons were killed by their father, and suppliants dragged from the altar or slain upon it" (3.81.2-5).
As the violence spread it brought a collapse in the habits, institutions, beliefs, and restraints that are the foundations of civilized life. The meanings of words changed to suit the bellicosity: "Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness." Religion lost its restraining power, "but the use of fair phrases to arrive at guilty ends was in high reputation." Truth and honor disappeared, "and society became divided into camps in which no man trusted his fellow" (3.82.1, 8; 3.83.1). Such was the conflict that inspired Thucydides' mordant observations on the character of war as "a savage schoolmaster that brings the characters of most people down to the level of their current circumstances" (3.82.2).
Although the Peloponnesian War ended more than twenty-four hundred years ago it has continued to fascinate readers of every subsequent age. Writers have used it to illuminate the First World War, most frequently to help explain its causes, but its greatest influence as an analytical tool may have come during the Cold War, which dominated the second half of the twentieth century, and which likewise witnessed a world divided into two great power blocs, each under a powerful leader. Generals, diplomats, statesmen, and scholars alike have compared the conditions that led to the Greek war with the rivalry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
But the story of what actually took place two and a half millennia in the past, and its deeper meaning, are ultimately not easy to grasp. By far the most important source of our knowledge is the history written by the war's contemporary and participant Thucydides. His work is justly admired as a masterpiece of historical writing and hailed for its wisdom about the nature of war, international relations, and mass psychology. It has also come to be regarded as a foundation stone of historical method and political philosophy. It is not, however, completely satisfactory as a chronicle of the war and all that the war can teach us. Its most obvious shortcoming is that it is incomplete, stopping in midsentence seven years before the war's end. For an account of the final part of the conflict we must rely on writers of much less talent and with little or no direct knowledge of events. At the very least, a modern treatment of accessible scope is needed to make sense of the conclusion of the war.
But even the period treated by Thucydides requires illumination if the modern reader is to have the fullest understanding of its military, political, and social complexities. The works of other ancient writers and contemporary inscriptions discovered and studied in the last two centuries have filled gaps and have sometimes raised questions about the story as Thucydides tells it. Finally, any satisfactory history of the war also demands a critical look at Thucydides himself. His was an extraordinary and original mind, and more than any other historian in antiquity he placed the highest value on accuracy and objectivity. We must not forget, however, that he was also a human being with human emotions and foibles. In the original Greek his style is often very compressed and difficult to understand, so that any translation is by necessity an interpretation. The very fact that he was a participant in the events, moreover, influenced his judgments in ways that must be prudently evaluated. Simply accepting his interpretations uncritically would be as limiting as accepting without question Winston Churchill's histories and his understanding of the two world wars in which he played so important a role.
In this book I attempt a new history of the Peloponnesian War designed to meet the needs of readers in the twenty-first century. It is based on the scholarship employed in my four volumes on the war aimed chiefly at a scholarly audience,2 but my goal here is a readable narrative in a single volume to be read by the general reader for pleasure and to gain the wisdom that so many have sought in studying this war. I have avoided making comparisons between events in it and those in later history, although many leap to mind, in the hope that an uninterrupted account will better allow readers to draw their own conclusions.
I undertake this project after so many years because I believe, more than ever, that the story of the Peloponnesian War is a powerful tale that may be read as an extraordinary human tragedy, recounting the rise and fall of a great empire, the clash between two very different societies and ways of life, the interplay of intelligence and chance in human affairs, and the role of brilliantly gifted individuals, as well as masses of people in determining the course of events while subject to the limitations imposed upon them by nature, by fortune, and by one another. I hope to demonstrate, also, that a study of the Peloponnesian War is a source of wisdom about the behavior of human beings under the enormous pressures imposed by war, plague, and civil strife, and about the potentialities of leadership and the limits within which it must inevitably operate.
1Adapted from the translation of Richard Crawley (Modern Library, New York, 1951). Throughout, references are to Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War unless otherwise indicated. The numbers refer to the traditional divisions by book, chapter, and section.
2These have been published by the Cornell University Press. Their titles are The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (1969), The Archidamian War (1974), The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition (1981), and The Fall of the Athenian Empire (1987).
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